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Nor Man nor Boy,
 Nor all that is at enmity with joy,
 Can utterly abolish or destroy !
 Hence in a season of calm weather
 Though inland far we be,
 Our souls have sight of that immortal sea
 Which brought us hither,
 Can in a moment travel thither,
 And see the children sport upon the shore,
 And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore.

HEGEL'S DOCTRINE OF CONTRADICTION.

TRANSLATED FROM ANTHON BULLINGER, BY ALICE A. GRAVES.

I.

Who has not heard it said, when the Hegelian philosophy has been under discussion, that Hegel has invalidated the so-called fundamental Law of Contradiction and its associated Law of Excluded Middle, and, in consequence of this capital crime against logic, has given his system a wholly illogical basis? The number of those who declare this is legion. It will be sufficient, however, as we here enter the lists in behalf of the Hegelian doctrine, to consider the arguments by which two chief representatives of logic attempt to protect it against this outrage, and confute the sore offender, Hegel. I refer to Trendelenburg in his "*Logische Untersuchungen*," and Ueberweg in his "*System der Logik*." The other antagonists of the category of Contradiction bring forward nothing further that is pertinent, and can very excusably be left out of consideration.

It is certainly true that this category is a constituent element in the Hegelian system; that Hegel conceived it as something actual, something freely given in objective thought and reality, as an immanent characteristic of things themselves. He has a very high opinion of this Contradiction, which is, according to him, not to be avoided. "Identity," says he, in the fourth volume of his "*Werke*," p. 68, "in distinction from Contradiction, is only the characteristic of the simple immediate, of dead Being. Contra-

diction, on the other hand, is the source of all activity and life ; only so far as anything has in itself contradiction is it vital, does it show tendency and activity.

It is likewise true that Hegel has not accepted as a genuine law of thought the principle of Excluded Middle, as given in the following formula : "Of two opposed predicates, only one can be assigned to anything ; there can be no third." But in that contradiction, which, according to Hegel, is an element of all reality, and in the principle of Excluded Middle which he rejects, are the contradictorily opposed judgments of the logicians—*à la* Trendelenburg and Ueberweg—under consideration ? At all events, in the rejected principle, what is spoken of is "two opposed predicates," not two contradictorily opposed predicates. Hegel says elsewhere : "The principle of Excluded Middle is the principle of the definite understanding, which tries to avoid contradiction, but in so doing falls into it. A must be either $+a$, or $-a$. But in the very statement itself there is already the third a , which is neither plus nor minus, but may be either. If $+W$ means six miles to the West, and $-W$ six miles to the East, and plus and minus cancel one another, the six miles of distance remains the same, with or without their opposition. Even the mere plus and minus of abstract distance, or number, have, if you like, zero for a third." We see by this, first of all, that Hegel is not considering contradictory, but contrary propositions, as the illustrations he gives plainly indicate. Ueberweg also makes this plain in referring to Kant ("System der Logik," p. 214), as, for example, the contradictory opposite, the "logical negation"—to use Trendelenburg's expression—of the mathematical $+a$ is by no means $-a$, but *not* $+a$. Indeed, in the very passage quoted—"The principle of Excluded Middle is the principle of the definite Understanding," etc.,—it is further seen that the contradiction designated by Hegel would not be simple subjective contradiction, "pure logical negation," but that he is thinking of contrary propositions and their relations. The coexistence of essentially opposite characteristics in one object, or conception, is what Hegel calls Contradiction. He expressly gives this definition in the note to § 89 of his "Encyclopædia."

In § 119 of the "Encyclopædia," and in the two notes to the same, cited by Trendelenburg and Ueberweg, Hegel gives the fol-

lowing examples of Contradiction : Middle and circumference of a circle, polarity in physics, north and south pole of the magnet, positive and negative electricity, organic and inorganic nature, nature and spirit, colors as regarded in polar opposition to one another, acid and base. Further, he calls the principle under discussion the principle of "Opposition," according to which Difference¹ has not *an* other in general, but *its* other set in opposition to it. He speaks, in passing, with appropriate contempt of the inanity of the opposition between the so-called contradictory notions and the nonsense perpetrated in Logic concerning them—for instance, of blue and not-blue, the latter not to be taken as an affirmative, something yellow, but only as an abstract negation. In the same sense, we might consistently say mind is either yellow or not-yellow.

In general, the categories of the Hegelian Logic must be conceived, not as subjectively formal, but as the constituent elements of objective thought, as the true, rational relations of Reality, including, of course, the categories of "Essential Difference," "Opposition," and "Contradiction." From all this it is clear that the Contradiction discussed in § 119 of the "Encyclopædia" is not the so-called Contradiction of subjective judgment, but should be conceived in the sense of Essential Difference, of Opposition, with which expressions it is interchangeable.

What the logicians have in mind in their defence of the so-called Law of Contradiction is not touched upon generally in the Hegelian Logic. Least of all is it referred to in these passages, where are developed the logical (logico-metaphysical) determinations of the objective, actual relations of Essence to (immediate) Existence. There is no allusion to subjective notions, and their possible misconceptions of immediate reality. Hegel has no interest in those wise and subtle teachings, to the effect that one can not at the same time both name a horse and deny that the animal named is a horse; or that if the exact definition of a horse is given, in case of the question whether one has a horse before him or not, the question must be answered only with Yes or No, and not by any means with "neither Yes nor No." These fine points

¹ The editor allows a profuse use of capitals in this article, most of the words used as categories being thus indicated.—En.

Hegel leaves to the professional logicians, along with Barbara, Celarent, etc., and much other "precious material." He himself has something better and more important to do.

II.

What constitutes for many the difficulty of comprehending the development of the Hegelian conceptions generally, and in particular Hegel's critique of the so-called Laws of Thought, and his own notions of the essential relations of Identity and Difference (contradiction), is the standpoint of abstract thought which they assume. Such thought, according to Hegel, is, indeed, an element of true rational thinking. Ideal differences are, indeed, to be definitely grasped and distinguished from one another. But this is not all that is necessary. To that first element of thought a second and third must be added. The thing itself, the content of the object, does not consist in abstract differences, but is in itself a living unity. The differences which the understanding fastens upon can not be in truth primitive and final. They must rather proceed from one another as the elements of a systematic whole—that is, from the dialectical unfolding of the whole. This is the dialectic element which develops Opposition, to which the speculative element is then added, thereby first making thought positively rational, and bringing it to the recognition of Opposition in Unity—*i. e.*, of the fact that the opposed elements are in truth one.

In rational thinking, the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity, like all other oppositions, is absorbed or cancelled. The Hegelian Logic is not concerned with human thought in abstraction from our spiritual Being, our conscious Ego, conceived as holding a merely subjective, formal relation to its object. It is concerned with the actual, living notion of the thing—the notion which is actual and living, both within us and without us, which is the Essence, the Soul of the Thing. It has its pure conscious existence in intelligent Spirit, and, consequently, so far as we really think in ourselves. It is here Spirit itself, in its innermost activity as that thinking Ego, which, as Aristotle of old recognized, is, before it thinks, all things in potentiality, and by its actual thinking of them becomes, in a higher spiritual manner, all things in reality. The Logic is concerned with the ideas which lie at the basis of all reality conceived by thought, and recognized by the

Spirit. Spirit, conscious of its kinship to all that is in heaven or earth, knowing itself as the truth, the quintessence, the soul, of all outer reality—which is nothing else than externalized Spirit—finds these ideas in itself, and cognizes them as ideas universal both in nature and in application, to which nothing stands abstractly out of relation, or in indissoluble opposition. It knows them as the elements of a concrete, living unity, which is the notion, or considered as notion that at once manifests its objective reality, and is at the same time conscious of itself, is the Idea.

The so-called law of thought concerning the nature of Identity says: "Everything is identical with itself." All things are related, the bond of Identity interlaces itself through the whole Universe. The Essence, which is the basis of all Appearance, is a Unity, comprehends in itself all diversity of definite Being, all differences. It is a unity, despite all Difference, despite all Opposition, which, with the equal value of a so-called law of thought, of an essential relation of all reality, stands opposed to Identity, and is a universal fact. What is true of the Universe, holds also of the individual. Everything—that is, each individual object—is, despite its relation to something else, independently self-identical, has in its relation to others its relation to itself.

But the Understanding does not comprehend Identity in this sense. To it Identity is not a Unity which encompasses Difference—a concrete Identity. If it were, then Understanding would no longer be abstract Understanding, but speculative Reason, and would regard both Identity and Difference as inclusive of one another and existing together. The Understanding applies the principle of Identity only in a trivial sense, as, for instance, "The sun is the sun," "Air is air," "The soul is the soul," "The body is the body." In reference to this, Hegel justly says that the Understanding, while it speaks of Identity, is already considering Difference—the Difference which appertains to entirely external comparisons, and does not proceed beyond these merely external differences in things having no relation to one another.

But if each thing is explicitly only identical with itself, and Difference is something external to it, belonging to a third, used as a comparative, then Difference belongs neither to "something" nor to "all." It constitutes no essential characteristic of this sub-

ject, and it can then not be said that everything contains Difference, which the Understanding persistently says. According to Hegel, one thing is distinguished from another, and thereby related to that other through its own specific character. It is at once related to self (self-identity), and related to another (opposition). This, according to Hegel, is the Contradiction given in the thing itself, and the exact contrary to that which the so-called law of Excluded Middle asserts.

After Hegel has pointed out that his category of "Contradiction" does not deal with contradictory terms, and that he differs from those logicians in his understanding of the principle of Excluded Middle, it is not fair for them to raise these objections. As they themselves best know, they do not agree among themselves as to the meaning of them, and, with the exceptions, perhaps, of Trendelenburg and Ueberweg, are not clear concerning them.

III.

The principle of Excluded Middle, as Hegel understood and rejected it, regards Difference not as difference in Identity, not as the opposition of Identity to itself, but as abstract, external Difference. Things different are regarded as independent of one another. Here it is indeed true that, of two opposed predicates, only one can be attributed to a subject; the other has nothing to do with it, and is external and indifferent, an abstract Identity without relation. In place of this principle of the abstract understanding, Hegel puts the rational principle of essential Difference. According to this principle, a thing does not have *an* other in general, but *its* other, set in opposition to it. Difference is the opposition within itself, of a thing as an identical whole, which, in contradiction to the principle of Excluded Middle, unites in itself opposite and contrary predicates.

Kant in his time did not overlook the necessity of contrary propositions concerning the same subject—the World, his so-called "Antinomies." He satisfied himself, in his own way, by absolving Reality from Contradiction, as "thing-in-itself." While pre-Kantian metaphysics and formal logic generally present, in explanation, their metaphysical view of things, Kant maintains that there can always be opposed, with equal authority and necessity, other assertions of a contrary nature. This inevitable Thesis and

antithesis, this "Antinomy," which Kant recognized, is Hegel's "Contradiction." Hegel perceived not only the four particular cases of antinomy that Kant specified as having their source in the cosmological Idea, namely, the world as both limited and unlimited by space and time; matter as both infinitely divisible and not infinitely divisible; all things in the world conditioned by cause, and yet having Freedom and an absolute beginning of action; the world as having and not having a cause. Hegel sees this contradiction in all objects of whatever kind, in all conceptions, notions, ideas. According to him, this contradiction is in the thing itself, and does not arise from an illusion of the Reason. On the contrary, it is necessary, genuine, and authoritative, the source of all motion and vitality. As Difference which is absorbed within itself, it is the origin of individuality, the principle of self-activity. So far from being an illusion of Reason, it is reason itself that everywhere points to a reconciliation of the opposed and contradictory elements into a higher unity, instead of remaining involved in Contradiction as an insoluble difficulty.

Anything is essentially different, has its own definite characteristics which separate it from another, only as this difference implies its very dependence upon that other; as, on the other hand, the latter only separates itself from the former, is its negation, in so far as it depends upon it. Each has in the other its antithesis, as spirit has its antithesis in nature, the north pole of the magnet in the south pole; positive electricity in negative, and *vice versa*. Each is thus referred to the other, has an essential, inner relation to the other, is identical with the other. Thus essential Difference is the contradiction of two forms of thought: Identity (with another) and Difference (from another). The abstract understanding abstracts from Identity when it considers Difference. It does not conceive it as a difference which implies difference, as the dialectic of two opposed characteristics (categories) bound up into unity. The understanding does not comprehend that the same subject may unite within itself two opposed, contradictory elements, as celestial mechanism unites the centripetal and centrifugal forces. It does not concern itself with such conceptions. To it, centripetal force is centripetal force—that is, is identical with itself. And the centrifugal force has the same self-identity, the two coming into only external, chance relations. According to this

conception, the celestial bodies would all rush to the centre if it were not that some hand or other had given them an impulse outward. Absolute mechanism, which sustains itself through its contradictory elements, does not exist to the understanding, just as the latter does not comprehend the dialectic of the one and the many. One is to the understanding simply one, and the many simply many. The understanding remains in this attitude of abstraction. But we can not consistently maintain this attitude. That anything in likeness to self is at the same time in opposition to self, is just as true as that there is no contradiction if there is only self-relation. It is not simply one thing distinguished from another thing, but it contains within itself difference, opposition, contradiction. The absolute unity of divine spirit posits itself as two-fold, and so is the negation of itself its own contradiction. It does this in the double sense that God absolutely, from all eternity, as pure Thought, as pure spiritual Reality, is in objective relation to Himself, discloses the element of Difference from self. At the same time, out of His very unity (God's power belongs to God, to the absolute spiritual unity, which is God) the creation of definite Being appears as Difference. Thus, also, finite, subjective spirit is not a simple unity, but, notwithstanding its self-identity, is manifold in powers and capabilities, and, without losing its individuality, its pure ideality, manifests itself in an endless diversity of ideas and notions, of Difference posited in its very simplicity. In the same way the unity of the animal life manifests itself as a manifold diversity of members and organs, which is still reflected in the Unity, continually returns into it, and is continually new-created from it. This Unity of animal life, the soul, is fundamentally the same as Spirit, is implicit spirit, which in man first becomes explicit. . . . Spirit still involved in the processes of Nature, dependent on its bodily manifestations, as yet having no comprehension of itself, is Natural Spirit—immediate, made known through nature. If any one takes exceptions to this characterization, and, referring to Hegel's definition of Nature as the Other-Being of Spirit, would object that Natural Spirit is unspiritualized spirit, it would only be one proof more that the opposers of Hegel's category of Contradiction are not in a position to understand what he says regarding it, because they attach more importance to the mere analytical understanding than to Reason. This abstract

understanding conceives that Other-Being as something absolute, excluding all Identity; it places spirit and nature, soul and body, in opposition as absolutely self-dependent, without reflecting that on this presumption their reciprocal relations, and the elements which they actually have in common, would not only be incomprehensible, but also impossible. This is not what Hegel means when he calls Nature the Other-Being of Spirit. Spirit does not act independently of nature, but freely as to Nature. It has absorbed Nature in itself, and Nature is not an abstract something else, absolutely separated from Spirit. It is rather Spirit external to itself. Nature is the Other-Being of Spirit, in the sense that Spirit itself has a twofold nature. It is within itself another, external, and alien to itself as pure and absolute Spirit. This Other-Being is not to be understood as other-being generally, but as the *Other-Being of Spirit*. Nature as opposed to Spirit is not something else existing for itself independently. Rather Nature has its being from Spirit, is only spirit externalized. In the relation of spirit to nature, soul to body, we have only the opposition of what is in itself identical. The soul in its relation to the body is not to be regarded as a separate abstract element, but as the Essence, which, notwithstanding its unity with the body, is yet distinguished from it, and rises above the sphere of its external expression to pure spiritual existence.

From what has been said, it should be clear that it is no "contradiction in terms" when Hegel designates soul as immediate, natural spirit. The "contradiction in terms" lies rather with the abstract understanding itself, meeting everything with "contradiction in terms!" It brings on its own dead abstractions, and believes that through them it will be able to comprehend this concrete, living Reality, and criticise rational conceptions of it. This concrete, living Reality has in itself Contradiction, and is in proportion concrete and living—admitting, however, that it undergoes and conquers contradiction, and out of it returns to unity with itself.

Says Hegel ("Encyc.," § 119, note 2): "Instead of speaking according to the principle of Excluded Middle, we should rather say 'Everything is in opposition.' There is, in fact, nowhere in Heaven or Earth, in the spiritual or in the natural world, an abstract 'Either-or' such as the understanding asserts. What-

ever is, is concrete, with Difference and Opposition in itself. The finitude of things consists in this: that their immediate Being does not correspond with what they implicitly are. For example: in the inorganic world an acid is at the same time a base; that is, its Being is plainly in reference to its other, a base. The acid does not remain in a quiet, inert opposition, but is always striving to realize what it is implicitly. Contradiction is what moves the world, and it is absurd to say that it is inconceivable. What can be correctly asserted is just this: that Contradiction can not end the matter, but through itself cancels itself. Even then this cancelled Contradiction is not abstract Identity, for this is itself only one side of the opposition."

Is not this comprehensible? And when Hegel thus explains Contradiction as a logico-metaphysical category, and cites such examples of it as he does, must we necessarily think of anything so nonsensical as "wooden iron," "iron which is not iron," "a donkey which is not a donkey," and the like? It certainly is not necessary, and the logicians have only half considered what Hegel wished to say, and really has said very plainly.

Ueberweg admits: "These teachings of Hegel (concerning the Laws of Thought) are, so far as contrary propositions are concerned, not without truth. The conception (or insight into the fact) that the separation of indifferent elements in opposition and their mediation to a higher unity is the form of all development in the life of Nature and Spirit, must be considered as a permanent result of Hegel's and Schelling's speculation" ("System der Logik," p. 204-218). Yet Ueberweg believed (p. 204) that "the application of this doctrine to the relation of contradictory propositions rests upon a confusion of logical negation with real opposition. Trendelenburg has proved this so clearly in his '*Logische Untersuchungen*' that I here need only to refer to his work."

The "proof" of which Ueberweg speaks is merely imaginary. Trendelenburg has not once made the attempt to demonstrate such a confusion on Hegel's part. But to Hegel's Dialectic, beginning with pure Being and proceeding, "via negationis," to the more comprehensive logical categories, he has opposed the purely supposititious dilemma that the negation conditioning their development must be either "pure logical negation" or "real opposition" ("Log. Unters.," i, p. 43). But logical negation

"which originates so entirely in thought alone that it nowhere really discloses itself in Nature, could not condition any such development of thought as that a new conception should arise, in which there would be positively united a negation and affirmation reciprocally related, for there can be no third, neither between nor beyond the members" (in logical negation). "Therefore it follows," he goes on to say, "that it is emphatically declared to be a misunderstanding when the Dialectic Negation is taken for contradictory negation" (44); and he can and will raise so little objection to it that he even makes the following additional observation: Hegel says ("Encyc.," § 81): "The Dialectic element is the self-annulling element belonging to these categories, by which they pass into their opposites (thus opposition, not mere negation)." That it was not Trendelenburg's intention to give that "proof" of which Ueberweg dreamed, appears from another remark on the same page, where he says: "If Dialectic should also attack the 'principle of Excluded Middle between two contradictories,' we could find nowhere else a principle upon which to rest indirect proof. Geometry, which has so often employed it, would have to mourn a delusion of two thousand years' duration." "If it should attack!" So Trendelenburg is not certain whether Hegel intended such a "*crimen læsæ logicæ*" or not; and he concedes in the passages cited that Dialectic Negation is not contradictory negation, but "real opposition." But further on he actually wants to prove that Dialectic thought reaches this opposition only by means of suppositions and conceptions borrowed from experience. This is an accusation which leads us to remark that Trendelenburg entirely misconceived the "freedom from presuppositions" which Hegel required in the derivation of the categories from the Immanence of pure thought. Thought which does not comprehend the absolute notion, which goes outside of all experience, is aimlessly looking into mere vacancy, cannot develop the categories of Logic. The Hegelian "freedom from presuppositions" is not thought of in this sense.

The philosophers who represent the subjective attitude naturally presuppose the acceptance of all possible experience in consciousness, and the psychologico-logical interpretation of the same. In the same sense Hegel presupposes all—the complete Notion, the Idea, Absolute Spirit; he does not begin with it. But in

objective relation there can be no presupposition made in the presentation if the categories of the Notion are not arbitrary, but to be developed with logico-dialectic necessity. In methodical development the categories proceed from the simple and universal to the particular and concrete. Whatever is made the beginning must be comprehensible in itself, and all that follows is explained through the development of the Notion in proper order. Should I begin with the "Notion," or "Ego," or "God," there would be implied in such a beginning a multitude of presuppositions—namely, whatever constitutes the Notion, Ego, or God. I must begin the development with an element of the Notion which presupposes nothing, and is given as absolutely intelligible to every thinking person; and since this, and all the following elements, are dialectically absorbed in their higher truth and become integral elements of the Notion as a whole, nothing must be omitted; the process of development must be by degrees. In this sense alone would the Hegelian Dialectic of the Notion be "free from presuppositions." It is not based on magic.

It is only the systematic presentation of philosophy that begins with the pure thought of the Logic, and its starting-point of pure Being. The subjective consciousness of the individual, however, must first work its way up from the immediacy of sensible perception through the different stages of phenomena to pure Thought and comprehending knowledge. It must assimilate the substance of truth, let it gradually reveal itself, and, in the process of getting rid of these incomplete attitudes of thought, it must place itself subjectively in sympathy with them, in order to gain the adequate Notion of the Thing and its development, its own Dialectic, and the negativity given in it. With this idea in mind, Hegel refers, in the Introduction to Logic, to his phenomenology of Spirit as explaining the beginning of philosophic knowledge. God and the World, then, could not be brought forth by magic, by one incapable of thought, out of hypothetic, abstract Being. Here the presupposition is Thought, a thinking Ego, with an experience of Reality, for which this Reality, in the sphere of phenomena and appearance, is transformed into pure Thought in the innermost Spirit, as in the region of fully revealed Essence and Truth. From such pure Thought the philosopher makes his deductions; he lets the complete Notion unfold itself through its own

immanent Dialectic. Dialectic thought needs to resort to no suppositions, needs no outside borrowing from experience. The Notion has effected a spiritual transformation of experience, is nothing else than experience fully grasped. So the Notion has the approving consciousness of having only taken possession of its own, and not in any sense of having committed robbery.

This external Reality of experience itself, indeed, depends upon thought, is only comprehended as proceeding from Spirit, from the eternally real and absolute thought of explicit Being, which, before and above all external experience, is in God. That empirical consciousness which rises through the process of phenomena to pure thought is indeed at bottom thought, only thought involved in an incomplete phase of its life of appearance, out of which it works its way upward at last to its true complete absolute existence—to pure thought. Dialectic Negation can—without subterfuge and without robbery—be “real Opposition”; and this it is, and by no means the “logical negation” of Trendelenburg. With such, Hegel’s Logic has nothing to do. It does not deal with merely formal thought separated from its object. It is at the same time Ontology and Metaphysics, and the categories of the Logic are the categories of objective thought, characteristics of Reality conceived by thinking Spirit. “My thought is nothing separated from its object, and the object is nothing separated from my thought,” writes Hegel in a letter to Pfaff. Hegel’s Logic, then, deals only with real Opposition, proceeding from the thing itself, and not with the “contradiction” of the logicians.

Opposition in its abstract aspect as Being and Nought (as presented in the first part of the Logic) is real Opposition, in which Difference is not yet determined, is not yet specific difference. It is real Opposition, and not that Nought which by a merely subjective conception is placed in contrast with objectively given Being, as a merely formal negation. Pure Being posits itself as Nought, in opposition to itself; it shows itself, on a nearer view, to coincide with Nought, and, *vice versa*, Nought is changed to Being, as can be analyzed out of the notion of Becoming by any one. The transition from Nought to Being—Becoming—is a phase of the Absolute, without the Absolute itself ever being transformed into mere Becoming. The immediacy of pure Being—which, ab-

stracting in thought from all specific character, we comprehend through thinking Spirit—is, as indeterminate Being, identical with Nought in God, and from him proceeds as definite, finite Being—so far as God is really Creator of the World.

This is the Becoming from Nought which Alexander von Humboldt could not comprehend (“Kosmos,” 1, p. 87), but it was only because he, like so many others, falsely conceived it. “Out of nothing comes nothing”; certainly a “nothing” posited by my subjective thought, imagined by me, *is* nothing, and nothing will come from it. The Nought from which the world proceeds is the abstraction of Being given in divine thought, through which God manifests, the fulness of his kingdom in finite existence.

IV.

There is so much clearly proved: that our two logicians, when Hegel claimed actuality, reality for his Contradiction, had a strong misgiving that he could not have duly considered their Contradiction, their negation, which has its origin in subjective thought alone. So Hegel must be properly instructed. We shall see how they succeed in doing it.

Contradiction, so the logicians dictate, is the contradictory opposition given in “pure logical negation.” A thing is either blue or not-blue. The logicians appeal to Aristotle, the Father of Logic, who in his time had accurately formulated the Law of Contradiction, and that of Excluded Middle as well. Now, what Aristotle says, it is well known, was asserted in opposition to the “flux of all things,” of Heracleitus. Contrary to him, Aristotle, in the first place, emphasized, as Plato did before him, that there is a sphere of the eternal exalted above all temporary beginnings and endings, above all transition; and, in the second place, he emphasized (referring to what is mutable) that something actually existing in reality could not at the same time be man and not-man, blue and not-blue. That it might have contradiction within itself, as potentiality, that by such potentiality it might unite within itself the opposition of Being and not-Being, he did not deny; he even emphatically stated as much (“Metaph.,” iv, 5, 1009, a 33, 88). On this point Aristotle, as well as Trendelenburg, agrees with Hegel. Trendelenburg knows too that ‘the principle of Contradiction (of formal logic) cannot be ap-

plied to the dynamic force which conditions and produces the objects of its application" ("Logisch. Unters.," ii, 154). But, says Trendelenburg, so soon as anything has *once become*, the Law of Contradiction comes into play. Ueberweg naturally says the same, and does not see the concession to Hegel's Contradiction which Trendelenburg has made in the passage cited. They both believed they had said something against Hegel.

Now, what did Hegel believe? Is a man—who certainly in his essence unites the self-contradictory elements of soul and body, nature and spirit, at the same time—to him—not a man? Or is acid, as actually existing acid, at the same time not an acid? That would indeed be mere nonsense. It is not the negation of itself as to its external, transient reality, but as to its inner potentiality, its essence. So long as a substance is in reality an acid, it is not in reality at the same time not an acid. If I should declare it not to be an acid, this contradiction would be in my subjective thought, and would, of course, have no objective value. To such a contradiction belongs the famous principle of Excluded Middle. Such a contradiction is indeed to be excluded, and the logicians may insist upon it as often as necessary. Hegel entirely agrees with them.

Let us now consider the subject of such a merely subjective judgment and contradiction, not simply taking a superficial view of its momentary existence, its external, transient reality, and its accidental properties, but also considering the Essence lying as the basis of its appearance, of its external reality. Let us reflect upon its inner nature, its soul, through which its external, definite Being is mediated, thus considering the subject fundamentally with its very root. We can certainly say that it is more than it appeared to be from a first superficial view. Acid is now no longer merely acid. It is merely acid for the apothecary, who sells it as such at a certain price. It is now, for us, according to its inner, essential nature, the negation of itself as acid, implicitly related to, dependent upon a base, and identical with it. Each has implicitly an identical Essence, now this, now that characteristic predominating. Each phase of existence is itself an opposition and difference, the contradiction being one that actually exists in the reality presented, not merely postulated in subjective thought. Each is so related to the other that they mutually embody one another, and are es-

entially inseparable. The north pole of the magnet can not be so separated from the south pole that there is no longer any opposition in the divided parts. As any one can see how far each pole of the magnet extends after this division, so it is very easily comprehended that, when an acid and base come into contact and mutually absorb one another in a higher, more complete mode of existence, these two elements, though externally distinguished as two different phenomena, are yet essentially never set free from one another. They have such a reciprocal affinity that each, even at the time of external separation, was its own opposite.

This opposition, this contradiction, develops these finite existences whose immediate reality does not correspond to their Notion, to what they implicitly are. It carries them beyond themselves to a higher unity, in which Contradiction disappears; and what they were implicitly, they explicitly become. The latent Contradiction, veiled as it were in immediate existence, manifests itself under given conditions. An activity begins in which the form of immediate existence as such is sacrificed, but as to its implicit nature its essence is preserved, and finds its summation in a higher aspect of Reality—as, for example, an acid and base are absorbed in a salt.

Trendelenburg discerns that in this transition, this process of Becoming, Contradiction appears as objective and actual, and that the so-called Law of Contradiction has nothing to do with this activity. He and Hegel can shake hands so soon as Trendelenburg concedes, what indeed he must concede—namely, that this Contradiction, vindicating itself in activity, has been implicit and latent in that which was changed before its transition. There must have been present already the elements of variance, as the very notion of transition implies.

When Trendelenburg reflects that in that part of Hegel's Logic where he discusses the categories of Identity, Essential Difference, and the Ground, he is dealing with the relation of Essence to immediate existence, and not with directions for reckoning up and schematizing outer, immediate Reality—as in the so-called Laws of Thought; when he considers, further, that Hegel accepts these Laws of Thought in their proper place—that is, in their application to finite relations and immediate, external Reality; when Trendelenburg reflects on all this, he can, at least

so far as "Contradiction" is concerned, desist from his contradiction of Hegel. We are not yet through with Ueberweg, however. He believes also, as concerns motion and transition, that if the higher Reality is to be attained, the appearance of Contradiction must first be removed. To this end "there must first be determined through exact definition a fixed line of limit." "For example" (in opposition to Hegel's assumption that at the instant of the transition from night to day, day and night both are and are not), "that instant toward daybreak when the mathematical centre of the apparent disk of the sun passes over the horizon can be taken for the boundary or limit of day" ("Syst. der Logik," p. 191). "This point of limit, since its extension must be called the same as nothing, is a nought of time, and therefore no positive predicate can be given it with logical justice. In reality, the middle point of the sun's disk which *has* passed the horizon follows the point which has *not* passed immediately, without any interval of time whatever. It would be a mere fiction if this point of limit should be assumed as something having Being, or as a real interval of time." But are not this "mathematical centre" and this "nought of time," taken as point of limit, much more fictions of the understanding, by means of which Ueberweg jumps over from a point not passed to a point passed without passing it? At any rate, the real middle of the sun's disk does cross the horizon at an actual instant of time, and at this instant of time, as well as shortly before and after, day and night are involved together, are in a strife with one another, from which day at last comes out victorious. Ueberweg has, as we see, turned the question we are considering upon exclusively quantitative external relations, and has abstracted entirely from qualitative differences and their transition, their absorption in one another. Trendelenburg, however, does not mean by "Motion" merely a change of position and a quantitative addition and subtraction. He has in mind also a qualitative transition and a "substantial" beginning and ceasing. The ideas of causality, production, creation, belong to the "Motion" of Trendelenburg, as to Aristotle's *κίνησις*. When through this "motion" a new object is "produced" according to Trendelenburg, how is it possible to determine the mathematical measure of the point of limit, as Ueberweg would do in the transition from day to night? The

transition is here not external, but in Essence, in the Notion, and this transition—Becoming—is the union of Being and Nought, is objective and actual Contradiction. It is not something postulated by subjective thought simply. This contradiction of Being and Nought in Becoming is an element of the Notion of all Reality, even of the Notion of Absolute Spirit. In living organisms it is a continual transition and transformation of the constituent elements and organs out of one another and into one another. Life, superior as such to the process, overcomes the contradiction given in it for a certain length of time only. Only spirit is superior to transition. Spirit endures the contradiction posited in it, and comes back to unity with itself out of its constituent differences. Human spirit, having arrived as spirit at self-consciousness, at independent existence, has its eternal home in absolute spirit, where, after laying aside the sensuous nature in which it abides as soul, it finds itself in the region of its own truth and freedom. Absolute spirit, the eternal and absolute Ego, returns out of the transitory world, as infinitely multiplied Ego, to itself. Absolute spirit, as God, is absolutely superior to Becoming as the abstract unity of Being and Nought; it is Becoming in its highest aspect as the activity of spirit in itself, which determines itself, and absorbs within itself again its own determinations. In God, Being is the totality of the Notion, and Nought in God is the freedom of self-determination as Negativity which to the highest degree absorbs¹ itself, and absolute self-affirmation, self-manifestation, which, according to Aristotle, is *νόησις νοήσεως*, and according to Christian doctrine is the triune process of life, is Becoming, in God as God. God does not “become” in the sense of not having existed before; yet this element of abstract Becoming, through which that becomes which was not before, is given in the Absolute (God and his efficient power). God as creator of the world posits this Becoming, and thereby this contradiction of determinate Being, which does not correspond to what it implicitly is, to its Notion. Temporal Being is the actual contradiction of an inner force externalized, a spiritual force existing as sensible Being.

¹ The word *absorbs* is used in this article as a translation of *aufhebt*, signifying the reduction to an element of a higher unit.—ED.

V.

. . . . An objector to the Hegelian category of Contradiction says, in allusion to Lotze's "*Geschichte der Æsthetik*": "The Notion itself does not change with things, but only its applicability to a definite sphere of existence. The same Notion continues true only as it is related to a thing, depends upon it, changes with it." Certainly such a notion of the understanding as is ready-made, fixed, unchangeable. Only it is a pity that in Reality (not abstract, dead Reality, but concrete and living) there is nothing to correspond to it; it is not the real, living Notion of the Thing. Another objector to Contradiction wrote in 1877: "No one doubts that every concrete thing is made up of different elements. But it is to be just as little disputed that the thinking subject must accept the object of thought as it is presented in the outset of the thought-process. The *real object* is subject to change and development, but the *logical subject* must be accepted at one time the same as at another." This amounts to saying that thought must hold fast to what was in the past, in a vanished moment of time, yet which was there not as a complete existence, but only half-way developed. Hegel, however, has nothing to say about the permanence in thought of a Reality which is itself not permanent. The Hegelian Notion is the Notion of the Thing, takes the Thing as it is and trusts to its own dialectic. "If the Thing changes, if the real object is subject to transition and development," then this constituent activity of the real object must be included in the Notion, if it is to be the concrete Notion of a concrete object. But what causes this continuing diversity in objects is Contradiction, which in its abstract aspect is the passing from Being to Nought, and *vice versa*—that is, Becoming. This abstract Contradiction is an element of the Notion of all concrete, living Reality. The logicians concede that contrary propositions can be united, and thereby—unless they wish to be guilty themselves of their own logical contradiction—they concede as a fact the Contradiction of (qualitative) Being and not-Being. The Difference of Being and Nought is the ground of all Differences. . . . The unity of Being and Nought, and their immediate passage into Becoming as is set forth in the beginning of the Logic, should not be conceived as concrete. It is not that the Being of

this concrete thing is immediately the not-Being of the same, as though it were continually destroyed and continually recreated; but that in it, so far as it is living, Being is continually passing into not-Being, and *vice versa*. The object holds out through this activity of Being and not-Being for a certain length of time, and at last its immediate sensible existence falls asunder and disappears in the current of Becoming. Only Spirit is superior to this current; in Spirit only is Reality adequate to the Notion.

"All must fall into Nought if it would continue in Being"—that is, in finite Being, which is indebted to Contradiction for its existence, and through the dialectic of which it is further developed.

Nevertheless, despite the sway of Contradiction and Negation, all is preserved, the preservation of which Aristotle wished to be assured. . . . Blue remains always blue. Flower, ox, cow, man himself—all these phases of existence remain always the same, are not destroyed by Contradiction, though many individuals among them fall into Nought. "Everything is transitory, but a cow's tail is always long," I hear a famous man often say. In other words, the intelligible world of (Platonic) Ideas, or, what is the same thing, the all-ruling Dialectic of the Notion, is untouched by destruction. The Absolute, with its Contradiction always arising and always overcome, does not contradict itself. . . .

In order to be more certain of at last effecting a reconciliation between Hegel and the logicians, and to be able to ask the opposers of Contradiction to allow the "Father of Life" to live, I make a final concession. It is this: that when we are dealing with purely external relations, with the abstractions of externality, direction in space, and the limitations in time of historical facts, according to Hegel himself, we are to apply the logic of the understanding, divested of dialectic and rational features, with its finite limitations, and especially with its Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle. . . . Trendelenburg need have no fear for Geometry, for Hegel, in the preface to "Phenomenology of Spirit," has explained his position in detail. He states, in substance, that, by reason of its content, the methods of analytic and synthetic cognition are pre-eminently adapted to Geometry, as in it the inflexible categories of the understanding and their applications of formal Identity are entirely in place.

So there need be no apprehension that the dialectic method will infringe upon the rights of the finite. We leave to Geometry its categories of the understanding, and to Michel his two *Groschen*—so long as he can keep them together—and admit that his reckoning must be based on these much-famed laws of logic. To the question whether Cæsar died on the Ides of March, 44 B. C., we certainly cannot answer Yes and No at the same time, nor can we say “neither Yes nor No”; the logicians are in the right here. This is either a shilling or else it is not a shilling; I have either paid my shoe-bill or I have not paid it; in all these cases the fundamental laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle must be appealed to. Only such logic should modestly keep within its sphere, and not try to deal with subjects not to be measured by its standards. It should not announce its finite categories and abstractions as though they were all-inclusive, and hence infinite and absolute.

MARTINEAU'S IDIOPSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS.¹

BY S. W. DYDE.

The subject-matter of this article is included under two heads: I, a statement in Mr. Martineau's own language of his ethical views; and II, a criticism of two of his fundamental conceptions—namely, his understanding of what is meant by a spring of action, and his view of volition. An estimate of his conception of volition must embrace some reference to his theory of conscience. Indirectly I aim to show that the difference between Utilitarian ethics on the one hand and on the other hand the ethics of intuition, as represented by Mr. Martineau's “Idiopsychological Ethics,” is not really radical, and that a possible reconciliation between these two conflicting theories is indicated now and then by Mr. Martineau himself. Although I dwell perforce upon the views of Mr. Martineau, with which I cannot completely agree, I do so in order to empha-

¹ “Types of Ethical Theory,” by James Martineau, D. D., LL. D., Principal of Manchester New College, London. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885. The theory discussed in this article covers pp. 1-279 of vol. ii. The references are to the first edition.